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A newsletter devoted to operational police officers in Canada.
Be Smart & Stay Safe
IN MEMORIAL
On September 7, 2009 21-year old Service 
de Police de la Ville de Levis, Quebec 
Constable Melanie Roy was killed in an 
automobile accident while responding  to an 
emergency call. 
Her vehicle went out of control and struck a bridge support. 
Another officer traveling  in front of her noticed that she was 
no longer following  and observed a large cloud of dust. He 
immediately turned around and located the crash.
She was transported to a local 
hospital where she succumbed to 
her injuries. Constable Roy had 
served with the agency for only 
three months.
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Source: Officer Down Memorial Page available at www.odmp.org/canada
OFFICERS PAY TRIBUTE
On Sunday September 27, 2009 hundreds of law enforcement officers from Canada and the United States 
attended a memorial service at Stanley Park to honour fallen peace officers.
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Unless otherwise noted all articles are 
authored by Mike Novakowski, MA. The 
articles contained herein are provided for 
information purposes only and are not to be 
construed as legal or other professional 
advice. The opinions expressed herein are not 
necessarily the opinions of the Justice Institute 
of British Columbia. “In Service: 10-8” 
welcomes your comments or contributions to 
this newsletter. If you would like to be added 
to our electronic distribution list e-mail Mike 
Novakowski at mnovakowski@jibc.ca.
POLICE LEADERSHIP 
APRIL 10-13, 2011
Mark your calendars. 
The British Columbia 
Association of Chiefs of 
Police, the Ministry of 
P u b l i c S a f e t y a n d 
Solicitor General, and 
the Justice Institute of 
British Columbia Police 
Academy are hosting  the Police Leadership 2011 
Conference in Vancouver, British Columbia. This 
is Canada’s largest police leadership conference 
and will provide an opportunity for delegates to 
discuss leadership topics presented by world 
renowned speakers.
www.policeleadershipconference.com
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ADMISSION PROVIDES RPG 
FOR BREATH DEMAND
R. v. Vandal, 2009 SKCA 79
  
Two police officers on patrol at about 
11:30 p.m. saw a truck with only one 
headlight. They followed the truck 
and activated the police car’s 
emergency lights, but the truck did 
not stop for some blocks until it was in a driveway. 
The police parked behind the truck and observed the 
accused get out from the driver’s 
s e a t a n d wa l k s l o w l y a n d 
cautiously to the back of the truck. 
The officer asked the accused why 
he did not stop when signalled to 
do so, but received no answer. The 
officer then asked the accused if he 
had consumed any liquor that night 
and he said "Yes, sir, I've consumed 
more - I've had more than the legal 
limit." The accused had glazed eyes 
and smelled of alcohol as he 
walked slowly and cautiously back 
to the police car with the officer. At 
the police car the accused was 
advised of his right to counsel, 
given the standard police warning, 
and read the breathalyzer demand. 
He subsequently provided a breath 
sample of 210mg% and was 
charged with driving over 80mg%.
 
At trial in Saskatchewan Provincial 
Court the judge ruled that the 
arresting  officer had the requisite 
grounds for the demand. The 
accused’s failure to stop when the 
emergency police lights were 
engaged, his lack of response when asked why he did 
not stop, his statement that he had had more than the 
legal limit, his glazed eyes, slow and careful walk 
and the odour of liquor on his person all led to a 
valid s.254(3) Criminal Code demand. The accused 
was convicted. An appeal to the Saskatchewan Court 
of Queen’s Bench was unsuccessful.
 
The accused then appealed to the Saskatchewan 
Court of Appeal arguing  the lower courts erred in 
concluding  that the arresting  officer had reasonable 
and probable grounds to believe his ability to drive 
was impaired by alcohol. In his view, the appeal 
judge erred in finding  that the arresting  officer 
subjectively believed he had committed the offence 
and that the arresting  officer's belief was objectively 
based on reasonable and probable grounds. In part, 
the accused submitted that his admission that he 
consumed more than the legal limit should not mean 
he was over 80mg% because people are not likely to 
know with a degree of precision 
w h a t t h e i r b l o o d a l c o h o l 
concentration is and there was no 
evidence as to what the accused 
understood was the legal limit. He 
pointed out that there were other 
levels related to consuming  alcohol 
under Saskatchewan’s Traffic Safety 
Act, such as 40mg% found in 
s.146(1) warranting  a twenty four 
hour prohibition.
“The test to determine if an officer 
has reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe an accused's 
ability to drive was impaired by 
alcohol has both a subjective and 
objective element,” said Justice 
Lane for the unanimous Court. “It 
was necessary for the officer to 
have reasonable grounds for 
believing  that the [accused] had 
operated his motor vehicle, either 
while impaired by the consumption 
of alcohol (s.253(1)(a)), or having 
consumed alcohol in such a 
quantity that the concentration in 
his blood exceeded the legal limit (s.253(1)(b)).” The 
accused’s admission that he was over the legal limit 
was sufficient, as the trial judge found, to give rise to 
the officer’s subjective belief. As for the objective 
portion of the test, Justice Lane stated:
In my view, the admission from the [accused] that 
he was driving after having consumed more than 
the legal limit, taken with the other observations 
made by the officer, also means his belief was 
“The test to determine if an 
officer has reasonable and 
probable grounds to believe 
an accused's ability to drive 
was impaired by alcohol has 
both a subjective and 
objective element. It was 
necessary for the officer to 
have reasonable grounds for 
believing that the [accused] 
had operated his motor 
vehicle, either while impaired 
by the consumption of 
alcohol ... or having 
consumed alcohol in such a 
quantity that the 
concentration in his blood 
exceeded the legal limit ...”
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objectively reasonable. The issue is not whether 
the admission ultimately turns out to be true and 
correct, the issue is merely whether it is 
sufficient in the totality of circumstances to 
supply reasonable and probable grounds for the 
demand. … [para. 12]
And it was not necessary for the Court to determine 
at what point in time the officer's belief that there 
were reasonable and probable grounds be assessed 
– at the time the officer formed the belief or at the 
time of the demand itself. “[T]he only indicia which 
changed between the two points in time was the 
smell of alcohol,” said Justice Lane. “There was 
sufficient evidence without the indicia of the odour 
of alcohol to give rise to reasonable and probable 
grounds to lead the arresting  officer to believe an 
offence had been committed.” The accused’s appeal 
was denied.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
GANGSTERS GIVEN $2,000 FOR 
PREDICTABLE & AVOIDABLE 
CHARTER BREACHES
R. v. Brown, 2009 ONCA 633
Fo l l o w i n g  a l e n g t h y p o l i c e 
investigation, about 1,200 Toronto 
police officers conducted a major 
police takedown on the Driftwood 
Crips gang. The gang  was involved in 
trafficking  firearms and drugs as well as acts of 
extreme violence. Approximately 100 gang  affiliates 
were arrested and 86 of those were brought before 
bail court for their first appearance. However, they 
did not appear before a justice within 24 hours as 
required by s.503(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. No 
arrangements had been made by police or Crown 
before the takedown to ensure there would be 
adequate time and resources to accommodate the 
large number of detainees. The Crown was granted 
an adjournment to review the files on all matters, 
but some of the hearings were set well beyond the 
three day adjournment permitted by s.516(1). 
Nine applicants brought habeas corpus applications 
to secure their immediate release or an earlier bail 
hearing  date. The judge found the applicants’ rights 
had been violated because they had not been 
brought before a justice within 24 hours and were 
remanded in custody longer than three days. In his 
view, ss.503(1)(a) and 516(1) ensure arrestees have 
an early opportunity for judicial review and a 
determination whether continued detention is 
warranted. He described these rights as “among  the 
most important provisions of the Criminal Code”, 
fortified by ss.10(c) (the right to habeas corpus) and 
11(e) (the right to reasonable bail without just 
cause). The judge ruled there was no defensible 
reason for what happened, despite Crown’s 
argument that any disclosure of the expected large 
scale arrest could compromise the police operation. 
The police operation was carefully planned and was 
many months in the making. Where resources are 
applied at the front end of the criminal justice 
process involving  the investigation of crimes and the 
arrest of suspects, then resources should also be 
applied at the back end. The “sheer number of 
24-hour suspension
Saskatchewan’s Traffic Safety Act 
s. 146 
(1) The driver's licence of a person whose 
venous blood contains not less than 40 
milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of 
blood is subject to suspension pursuant to 
this section.
(2) At any time and at any place, a peace officer 
may request a driver of a motor vehicle to 
surrender his or her driver's licence to the 
peace officer if the peace officer has 
reasonable grounds to believe that the driver 
may have consumed alcohol in an amount 
that would make his or her driver's licence 
liable to suspension.
(3) Subject to subsection (4), if a peace officer 
makes a request pursuant to this section for 
the surrender of a driver's licence, the 
driver's licence is suspended for 24 hours 
from the time of the request.
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persons arrested [did] not 
provide a justification for 
f a i l u r e t o ab ide by t he 
requirements of the Criminal 
Code.” The accuseds’ Charter 
rights to liberty under s.7, 
arbitrary detention under s.9, 
and reasonable bail under s.
11(e) were breached. The judge 
denied the remedy of release 
but expedited the bail hearings 
and awarded each applicant 
$2,000 under s.24(1) as a just 
and appropriate remedy. The Crown appealed the 
order to pay costs to the Ontario Court of Appeal. 
Ordinarily, an accused person in a criminal case is 
not entitled to costs unless they can show “a marked 
and unacceptable departure from the reasonable 
standards expected of the prosecution.” Justice 
Sharpe, authoring  the unanimous judgement, put it 
this way:
It has been recognized in many cases that while 
costs awards in favour of the winning party are a 
familiar feature of civil proceedings, they are 
rare in criminal cases ... This difference derives 
from the different purposes of civil and criminal 
proceedings. Civil cases are concerned with 
compensation and the efficient resolution of 
disputes. Costs awards compensate the 
successful litigant, at least partially, for the 
expense of litigation. Costs awards also serve as 
an important judicial tool to 
c o n t r o l p r o c e e d i n g s , 
discourage unreasonable or 
inappropriate behaviour, and 
encourage out of court 
settlements.  The threat of 
a d v e r s e c o s t s a w a r d s 
discourages unnecessary or 
f r ivolous l i t iga t ion and 
encourages parties to settle 
their disputes.
Criminal proceedings are not 
brought by one party to 
vindicate a private interest but in the interest of 
the public at large ... [A] plaintiff brings an 
action for his own ends and to benefit himself; it 
is therefore just that if he loses he should pay the 
costs. A prosecutor brings proceedings in the 
public interest, and so should be treated more 
tenderly. There is a concern that if costs awards 
were routine, the discretion of the Crown when 
acting in the public interest would be unduly 
influenced or fettered... [references & internal 
quotes omitted, paras. 17-18]
 
In this case, the Crown’s conduct was described by 
the appl ica t ion judge as “ improper and 
unacceptable”, caused by its failure to make the 
necessary arrangements to have sufficient court 
resources available:
[T]he arrest of the [applicants] was part of an 
operation that involved careful and detailed 
planning. The central element of that careful and 
detailed plan was the sudden and sweeping 
arrest of a large number of suspects.  The 
execution of such a plan was bound to 
overwhelm the ordinary capacity of the bail 
court to handle those arrested in a timely 
fashion. Regrettably, however, the otherwise 
careful and detailed plan entirely ignored the 
obvious fact that unless something was done to 
ensure that adequate court resources would be 
available on the morning of the sweeping arrests, 
chaos and the denial of the statutory and Charter 
rights of those arrested was inevitable.
The [applicants] should not have been required 
to bring habeas corpus applications to secure 
their statutory and Charter rights. The situation 
that produced their need to resort to this remedy 
HIGHLIGHT THE CHARTER RIGHT
s. 7 Everyone has the right to life, liberty and 
security of the person and the right not to be 
deprived thereof except in accordance with the 
principles of fundamental justice.
..........
s. 9 Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily
detained or imprisoned.
.........
s.11(e) Any person charged with an offence has the 
right ... (e) not to be denied reasonable bail without 
just cause, ...
“Criminal proceedings are not 
brought by one party to vindicate 
a private interest but in the interest 
of the public at large ...  There is a 
concern that if costs awards were 
routine, the discretion of the 
Crown when acting in the public 
interest would be unduly 
influenced or fettered.”
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was entirely predictable.  It could and should 
have been avoided. [paras. 22-23]
Here, the applications judge “had identified a 
systemic failure in the processing  of the [accuseds] 
post-arrest which resulted in a serious violation of 
their rights, and he was entitled to mark his 
disapproval of what had occurred by ordering  the 
Crown pay the costs of proceedings that should 
never have been required,” said Justice Sharpe. 
“While the appropriate remedy in most cases 
involving  delayed bail hearings will be to direct or 
conduct an expedited hearing, the application judge 
found this to be an exceptional case calling  for an 
exceptional remedy.” And even though this 
prosecution involved serious charges against 
dangerous individuals, any departure from the rights 
secured by the Criminal Code and the Charter could 
not be justified. “Quite apart from the need to 
respect the rights of those eventually found to be 
guilty, sweeps of this kind will often bring  before the 
court bystanders who were simply in the wrong 
place at the wrong time,” stated Justice Sharpe.
Although costs in criminal cases are an exceptional 
remedy to be awarded only in “rare” cases, this was 
one such case within the exceptional category 
calling  for an award of costs. Without laying  blame 
for the constitutional violations on any one 
prosecutor, the systemic failure of the Crown to take 
any steps to avoid the entirely predictable violation 
of the statutory and Charter rights of the accuseds 
supported the award of costs. And $2,000 per 
applicant was not unreasonable.  
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
LATIN LEGAL LINGO
Habeas Corpus - “You have the 
body” - a prerogative writ used to 
determine the legal ity of a 
detention; an instrument to 
safeguard individual liberty against 
arbitrary and lawless state action.
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Right to Silence
“The criminal process is both 
accusatorial and adversarial.  
R e s p e c t f o r i n d i v i d u a l 
autonomy and privacy dictates 
that when the prosecution levels a criminal 
accusation, it must investigate and prove its 
case without any compelled assistance from 
t h e t a r ge t o f t h a t a cc u s a t i o n .  T h e 
co n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o s i l e n ce, t h e 
constitutional protection against self-
incrimination and the constitutionally 
protected presumption of innocence all reflect 
the fundamental importance of the principle 
protecting an accused from conscription to the 
cause of the prosecution. An accused is 
constitutionally entitled to say “prove it” and 
nothing more in answer to a criminal charge.”  - 
Ontario Court of Appeal Justice Doherty in R. v. 
Wright,  2009 ONCA 62 at para. 17.
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ADULT ABORIGINAL 
INCARCERATION
A recently released Statistics Canada report entitled 
“The Incarceration of Aboriginal People in Adult 
Correctional Services” shows the disproportionate 
rate at which Aboriginals are incarcerated. 
Aboriginals are people identifying  with North 
American Indian, Metis, or Inuit. Highlights of the 
report include:
• Aboriginal adults are more represented in 
custody than non-Aboriginal adults. 
• In 2007/2008  there were 369,200 admissions to 
correctional services. 
• Women accounted for 12% of all admissions to 
provincial and territorial sentenced custody and 
6% of federal admissions. Aboriginal woman 
were more represented among  the female 
correctional population than were Aboriginal 
men within the male correctional population.
• The median age of a person admitted to federal 
custody was 33 years.
• In 2007/2008 Aboriginal adults accounted for 
22% of admissions to sentenced custody while 
representing  only 3% of the Canadian 
population.
• In Saskatchewan Aboriginal adults represented 
11% of the general population while representing 
81% of admissions to provincial sentenced 
custody. Saskatchewan’s incarceration rate of 
non-Aboriginals on Census Day in 2006 was 0.5 
per 1,000 population while the incarceration rate 
for Aboriginals was 15.7 per 1,000 population. 
Th e A b o r i g i n a l i n c a rc e ra t i o n r a t e i n 
Saskatchewan is about 30 times higher than the 
non-Aboriginal incarceration rate. 
Source: Statistics Canada, 2009, The Incarceration of 
Aboriginal People in Adult Correctional Services, 
catalogue no.85-002-X, Vol. 29, no. 3.
2007/2008 ADULT ADMISSIONS TO 
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES
Admissions Percent
Remand 41.8%
Provincial/Territorial Sentenced Custody 22.9%
Probation 22.0%
Conditional Sentences 4.7%
Community Release (CSC) 4.0%
Federal Sentenced Custody 1.4%
Other 3.2%
2007/2008 ABORIGINAL ADMISSIONS TO 
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES
As a percentage of Canadian population 3%
Admissions Percent
Remand 17%
Probation 16%
Conditional Sentences 19%
Provincial/Territorial Sentenced Custody 18%
Federal Sentenced Custody 18%
Saskatchewan’s Aboriginal & Non-Aboriginal 
Incarceration Rate
Ages Aboriginal 
Incarceration Rate 
per 1,000
Non-Aboriginal 
Incarceration Rate 
per 1,000
20-24 26.6 1.0
25-34 21.9 1.2
35-44 17.4 0.8
45-54 8.2 0.4
55+ 1.6 0.1
All ages 15.7 0.5
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EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
DIFFERS FROM EYEWITNESS 
RECOGNITION
R. v. Ba, 2009 BCCA 400
A person was beaten and stabbed in 
a restaurant by at least two men. 
After the attack, the accused fled the 
scene but was found by police a 
short distance away with the 
assistance of a tracking  dog. Some of his clothing 
was soaked in blood. The victim later selected the 
accused and identified him from a photo pack and 
said he was 100% sure. At trial in British Columbia 
Provincial Court the victim made an in-court 
identification at trial and testified he had seen the 
accused on two prior occasions and recognized him 
during  the course of the attack.  The defence did not 
challenge the admissibility of the photo line-up 
evidence but contested the weight to which it should 
be assigned. The accused was convicted of 
aggravated assault and assault with a weapon.
The accused appealed his convictions to the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal arguing, in part, that the 
trial judge failed to consider factors relevant to 
identification when he found this was a case of 
recognition rather than identification. But Justice 
Donald, delivering  the opinion of the unanimous 
court, disagreed:
There was, in my opinion, a solid evidentiary 
basis for the judge’s finding  that this was a case 
of recognition rather than identification of a 
person previously unknown to the victim.
ABORIGINAL PEOPLE AS A PROPORTION OF  ADMISSIONS TO CORRECTIONAL SERVICES
Province % 
Population
% 
Remand
%
Provincial/
Territorial Custody
% 
Probation
% 
Conditional 
Sentence
British Columbia 4% 20% 21% 19% 17%
Alberta 5% 36% 35% 24% 16%
Saskatchewan 11% 80% 81% 70% 75%
Manitoba 12% 66% 69% 56% 45%
Ontario 2% 9% 9% 9% 12%
Quebec 1% 4% 2% 6% 5%
Newfoundland 4% 23% 21% .. 23%
New Brunswick 2% 9% 8% 8% 11%
Nova Scotia 2% 9% 7% 5% 7%
Prince Edward Island 1% 6% 1% .. ..
Yukon 22% 78% 76% 66% 62%
Northwest Territories 45% 85% 86% .. ..
Nunavut 78% .. .. 97% 97%
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[T]he two categories are treated differently. .... 
“The distinction between cases of eyewitness 
identification of a person seen for the first time 
and cases where the witness recognizes 
someone previously known to them is well-
discussed in the case authorities...” 
The main point taken by the [accused], as I 
understand it, is that by treating this as a case of 
recognition, the trial judge applied a less 
stringent standard for eyewitness identification 
which may have led him to disregard 
circumstances calling into question the 
reliability of the identification. First among  those 
listed was the condition of the victim when he 
made his observation of the second attacker, said 
by him to be the [accused]. By then he had 
already suffered stab wounds, and blows from 
the first attacker and therefore the [accused] 
argues he was rendered unable to make an 
accurate identification.
This was squarely before the judge. The gist of 
his findings on this point is that he accepted the 
victim’s testimony about being able to see and 
recognize the [accused]. He found substantial 
confirmatory evidence including the blood 
soaked clothing, corroboration of the two prior 
encounters and the photo pack identification. 
[references omitted, paras. 8-11]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
GAME BOOTH AT FAIR A ‘PUBLIC 
PARK’ FOR PROHIBITION 
ORDER
R. v. Perron, 2009 ONCA 498
The accused pleaded guilty to sexual 
interference and sexual touching 
against the complainants who were 
between the ages of 12 and 14.  The 
accused’s sentence included an order 
pursuant to s.161(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, 
prohibiting  him from attending  a public park where 
persons under the age of 14 were present or could 
reasonably be expected to be present. A few months 
later he was arrested while working  in a game booth 
that involved throwing  darts at balloons at the Super 
Ex, a fair being  held on the grounds of Lansdowne 
Park in Ottawa. Lansdowne Park contains a football 
stadium, a civic centre with a hockey arena, and 
several other buildings. There were trees and grassy 
areas around the perimeter of the property and 
surrounding  some of the buildings. There is also an 
extensive paved area that serves as a parking  lot for 
events. The grounds are surrounded by a fence and 
are accessible to the public through several gates.  
There is an admission fee to gain entry. The Super Ex 
included mid-way rides, game booths, concert areas, 
food courts, and a petting  zoo. The accused’s game 
booth was located in a long  corridor of game booths 
lined with stuffed animals and other trinkets that 
could be won as prizes.  The corridor was on the 
paved area. The Super Ex was attended by what was 
described as a very young  crowd, with a lot of 
young  people who appeared to be between 12 and 
16 years of age or even younger.
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the accused 
conceded that the Super Ex at Lansdowne Park was 
accessible to the public and was a place where 
persons under the age of 14 years were present or 
could reasonably have been expected to be 
present. However, the accused contested that he was 
attending  a park. The trial judge found that the Super 
Ex at Lansdowne Park was a public park as that 
phrase is used in s.161(1)(a) and the accused was 
convicted.
The accused then appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing  Super Ex was not a park within the 
meaning  of s.161(1)(a). In his view, a park ordinarily, 
in its regular everyday use, referred to a green space, 
such as an area with lawns and gardens or forests 
and trees, which is set aside and maintained for 
recreational use by the public. What is in essence a 
parking  lot cannot be turned into a park by virtue of 
the way it is being  used. The Crown, on the other 
hand, submitted that a public park cannot be 
circumscribed by the physical geography of the land 
but must be significantly informed by the use made 
of it.  
The Ontario Court of Appeal first noted that there 
was no definition of “public park” in the Criminal 
Code. As a result, the Court would need to use the 
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rules of statutory interpretation 
in defining its meaning:
The purpose of s. 161(1)(a) is 
to protect children from 
becoming  victims of sexual 
offences at the hands of those 
w h o h a v e p r e v i o u s l y 
committed certain specified 
offences.  The protection of 
this particularly vulnerable 
group in Canadian society must inform the task 
of construing the phrase in issue in this appeal. 
Section 161(1)(a) addresses the legislative 
objective by specifying  a number of locations 
that an offender can be prohibited from 
attending. The context provided by the full list of 
locations is of assistance in construing the 
phrase in issue here. Some locations such as day 
care centers or school grounds are places where 
children will inevitably be present because of 
the activities carried on there.   However, this is 
not necessarily so for other locations such as 
public parks.  ... [N]ot all public parks are places 
w h e r e c h i l d r e n a r e l i k e l y t o b e 
found. Wilderness parks for example are public 
parks where nothing goes on that is likely to 
attract children. However, consistent with the 
legislative objective, only public parks where 
children are present or can reasonably be 
expected to be present can be included in a 
prohibition order. In other words, Parliament has 
specified locations in s. 161(1)(a) because what 
goes on there makes it likely that young children 
will be present.
The grammatical and ordinary sense of the 
words in s. 161(1)(a) is informed by the 
definitions of “park” found in the Canadian 
Oxford English Dictionary ... : 
park/ park/ n. 1 a piece of land usu. with lawns, 
gardens, etc.  in a town or city, maintained at 
public expense for recreational use. 2  a large area 
of government land kept in its  natural state for 
recreational  use, wildlife conservation, etc. 3  a 
large enclosed area of  land etc., either public or 
private, used to accommodate wild animals in 
captivity (wildlife park). 4 (usu.  in combination) a 
an area devoted  to a specified purpose (industrial 
park).  b  an area developed  for a particular form of 
recreation (snowboard park;  water park; theme 
park). 5 N. Amer. an enclosed arena, area, 
stadium, etc. for sports events (esp. ballpark). 6 an 
area for motor vehicles etc. to be left 
in (trailer park).  7 the gear position 
or funct ion in an automat ic 
transmission in which the gears are 
locked, preventing  the vehicle’s 
movement. 8  a large enclosed piece 
of ground, usu. with woodland and 
pasture, attached  to a stately home 
etc.
The first six are of relevance 
here.  All are specified locations 
characterized by what goes on 
there.   For most of the six, it is some form of 
recreational activity.
Finally, in construing the phrase describing  the 
location that the [accused] is prohibited from 
attending, sufficient clarity must be given. An 
individual bound by a prohibition order should 
be able to know what it requires, since breach of 
the order constitutes a criminal offence.   ... 
[references omitted, paras. 13-17]
In this case, the Appeal Court rejected the accused’s 
contention that only green space qualifies as a 
public park:
... The legislative purpose, the kinds of locations 
that can be included in a prohibition order, and 
the ordinary grammatical meaning of the words 
clearly focus on the kinds of recreational 
activities that the public can engage in at the 
particular location and whether they are likely to 
involve the presence of young  children. There is 
nothing  to suggest that a particular physical 
geography is a vital characteristic.  Indeed there 
are many locations commonly referred to as 
parks which exhibit little if any greenery.  
Skateboard parks are but one example. While in 
a particular case the presence of greenery may 
help in identifying  a location as a public park for 
the purposes of a prohibition order under s. 
161(1)(a), I do not think that the absence of 
greenery necessarily excludes it.
In my view, to breach this term of a prohibition 
order under s. 161(1)(a), the person bound by it 
must be attending at a defined or discrete 
location that is accessible to the public for 
recreational use that involves or is reasonably 
likely to involve children under the specified 
age.   In particular cases, other factors may also 
be relevant, such as the presence of greenery or 
the public designation of the location as a park.  
“The purpose of s. 161(1)(a) is 
to protect children from 
becoming victims of sexual 
offences at the hands of those 
who have previously committed 
certain specified offences.”
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Construed in this way, the phrase “public park… 
where persons under the age of fourteen years 
are present or can reasonably be expected to be 
present” best serves the legislative purpose and 
is most faithful to the ordinary and grammatical 
sense of the words in their legislative context.  
Moreover, it provides the clarity necessary for 
the person bound by the order to know the 
locations that must be avoided.
Justice Goudge concluded that the Super Ex at 
Lansdowne Park was a public park. The accused was 
“at a defined location to which the public had 
access for recreational use that included or could 
reasonably be expected to include the presence of 
persons under the age of fourteen years.  Moreover, 
in this case, there was some greenery at the location 
although it was peripheral. Finally, the location itself 
was publicly designated as a park. A person in the 
[accused’s] position would reasonably know that he 
cannot attend that location in those circumstances.” 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
CARNIVAL NOT A ‘PLAYGROUND’
FOR PROHIBITION ORDER
R. v. Lachapelle, 2009 BCCA 406
The accused was arrested after a 
police officer saw him walk to a 
hamburger stand at a carnival. The 
carnival, or amusement fair, visited 
the town once a year. It featured 
rides, games and food stands and it was held on a 
piece of private property. There was no fee for 
admission to the site but customers were charged for 
rides, food and games. The accused had an order 
under s.161 of the Criminal Code prohibiting  him 
f rom a t tending  any p layground. He was 
subsequently charged with failing  to comply with 
the prohibition order.
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the trial 
judge noted that there had been no “typical 
playground equipment” in the immediate vicinity of 
where the accused had been found, but that children 
had been using  the rides some 20 to 30 paces away, 
and running  and playing  in an open area. The 
arresting  officer, in describing  the carnival as the 
“ultimate playground” for area residents, testified 
that many families were at the carnival with young 
children, that some nine or ten-year-olds were 
without adult supervision and that the carnival was a 
“magnet” for the children of area.  The accused, on 
the other hand, opined that he was not prohibited 
from going  to the carnival because it was located on 
a private hayfield. He said he was only there to have 
a burger with his aunt. 
The trial judge was not satisfied that “public park” 
included a carnival located on private land even 
though the public had access to it and children 
under 14 could be expected to be present. In his 
analysis, a “public park” was ordinarily a place “set 
aside” for use by the public, and more than a place 
accessible to the public. As for the meaning  of 
“playground”, he ruled that a playground for the 
purposes of s.161 must be something  more than 
someone playing  on a piece of ground, otherwise a 
vacant lot, a street hockey game, or many other 
activities in a public area could be interpreted as a 
playground. The accused was acquitted. 
The Crown then appealed to the British Columbia 
Supreme Court. The appeal judge rejected the 
Crown’s submission that the carnival was a “public 
park” because the proposed analysis would require 
the individual and the court to determine whether 
the recreational use and degree of access at the time 
would qualify the location as a “public park” rather 
than deciding  whether the geographical location 
was set aside or designated as such. As for whether 
the carnival was a “playground”, a similar concern 
arose. It too would require the individual and the 
court to analyze and assess the nature of the activity 
carried on or likely to be carried on at a location at a 
particular time. A playground is commonly 
understood to be an area with swings, climbing 
equipment or other facilities designed for children 
and is usually located in a park or school or other 
location established by a community and set aside 
or designated as such. The Crown’s appeal was 
dismissed.
The Crown then appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing  the lower courts wrongly 
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focussed on the “designation” of a place rather than 
the manner in which it is being  used. In the Crown’s 
view, the appeal judge drew an overly narrow 
definition of the word “playground”. Instead, the 
Crown submitted that “playground” should be 
interpreted to refer to “areas where children are 
likely to congregate for the purposes of play,” a 
meaning  consistent with dictionary definitions of 
“playground”. Justice Newbury, writing  the 
unanimous decision, noted there were two areas of 
tension arising  with the construction of “playground” 
as it appears in s.161(1)(a). 
• a tension between the designation of a space and 
the activities carried on there. One being  “an 
activity-centred approach that looks to ‘what goes 
on there’ rather than what the space is called or 
‘designated’.” 
• a tension between the ordinary or grammatical 
meaning  of a word and the context in which it is 
used. “When a statutory provision is to be 
interpreted the word or words in question should 
be considered in the context in which they are 
used, and read in a manner which is consistent 
with the purpose of the provision and the 
intention of the legislature ... If the ordinary 
meaning  of the words is consistent with the 
context in which the words are used and with the 
object of the act, then that is the interpretation 
which should govern.”
The Court of Appeal concluded that the carnival was 
not a “playground”:
In my respectful view, we would be permitting 
context to overwhelm the ordinary and 
grammatical meaning of the word “playground” 
if we were to accede to the Crown’s argument. If 
it were correct, the term would include a cul de 
sac at the end of a street where children play 
hockey, a courtyard between two office towers 
where older children play with skateboards, or a 
private driveway with a basketball hoop. In my 
opinion, these are not ordinarily referred to as 
“playgrounds” because they are not outdoor 
areas whose purpose is to provide children with 
a place to play. I do not suggest that a 
“playground” must necessarily be a permanent 
structure or facility, nor that particular facilities 
or equipment must be provided, but the purpose 
of the site should be clear. (Usually the purpose 
of a playground is made evident by facilities 
such as swings.) I do suggest that “what goes on 
there” is not the only criterion incorporated by 
the ordinary and grammatical meaning of the 
word “playground”. Most of the dictionary 
definitions mentioned above connote a purpose 
for which the space is intended, rather than 
merely the use of space, whether temporary or 
permanent, formal or informal. By keeping sight 
of this “ordinary sense”   of the term, a balance 
may be achieved between the objective of 
protection of children and the principle  that an 
offender who is subject to an order under s. 161 
should be in a position to know where he is 
allowed and not allowed to be found. As well, 
the overbreadth problem ... may be avoided.
I conclude, then, that ... the ordinary meaning of 
“playground” [refers] to an outdoor area the 
purpose of which is to accommodate play by 
children. Overall, the carnival was a commercial 
operation intended for the amusement of the 
public. The “public” of course includes children, 
but we were not referred to any evidence to the 
effect that children’s play was its main object or 
purpose. A carnival may have rides intended for 
children but will also have other amusements 
intended for adults or for families generally. No 
doubt a carnival in Gitanmaax is different from a 
larger operation such as the P.N.E. in Vancouver, 
but I do not think that either would be referred 
to as a “playground” in the grammatical and 
ordinary sense of the word, even read in the 
context of s.161 and harmoniously with the 
object and scheme of the Code and the intention 
of Parliament. Had it been Parliament’s intention 
to prohibit sexual offenders such as [the 
accused” from attending at any place where 
children are present or may be expected to be 
present for purposes of play, it would have been 
an easy matter to say so.
Finally, it should be noted that the Crown’s 
argument on this appeal was based on the 
notion that the carnival as a whole constituted as 
a “playground”. It may well be that in 
appropriate circumstances a ‘sub-area’ of a 
multi-purpose site could be said to constitute a 
“playground” within the meaning of s. 161(1)(a) 
of the Code. That situation did not arise in this 
case, however, since there was no finding that 
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the carnival included an area intended only for 
children’s play and in any event, [accused] was 
arrested in a line-up for food some distance from 
where any rides were located. [references 
omitted, paras. 31-33]
The Crown’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
Editor’s note: Crown was granted leave to appeal on 
the sole issue of whether the carnival was a 
“playground” for the purpose of the s.161(1) order. 
Leave was not granted for the interpretation of the 
meaning of “public park”. 
KNOWLEDGE OF BARREL 
LENGTH IMMATERIAL TO 
PROHIBITED FIREARM CHARGE
R. v. Williams, 2009 ONCA 342
Af te r r ece iv ing  a t ip f rom a 
confidential informant, Toronto’s Guns 
and Gang  Unit made a high-risk 
takedown of a motor vehicle thought 
to be driven by an individual armed 
with a weapon. The accused was not the suspected 
individual, but he was a passenger in the vehicle.  
When he exited the vehicle at the request of the 
police, he was carrying  a loaded Krieghoff Suhl 9 
millimetre Luger handgun with a barrel length of 
102.07 millimetres - a prohibited weapon - in the 
waistband of his pants. The gun had ammunition in 
the magazine and the chamber.  The accused was 
charged with eight counts relating  to the handgun, 
but was only convicted of possessing  a firearm 
without a licence or a registration certificate. He was 
sentenced to 9 months in custody in addition to 15 
months credit for pre-trial custody – the equivalent 
of 2 years’ imprisonment.  But 
he was acquitted of possessing 
a loaded prohibited firearm. 
The trial judge sitting  in the 
Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice held that the accused’s 
ignorance of the length of the 
barrel of the handgun in 
question negated the mens rea 
necessary for a conviction 
under s.95(1) of the Criminal Code. The other 
charges were either dismissed or withdrawn by the 
Crown. 
The Crown appealed the accused’s acquittal for 
possession of a loaded prohibited firearm to the 
Ontario Court of Appeal arguing  the accused did 
have the necessary mens rea for the offence. The 
accused, on the other hand, admitted that the 
handgun was a prohibited weapon, that it was found 
on his person, that it was loaded, and that he was 
not licenced nor did he have a registration certificate 
for the gun. But he submitted he did not have the 
necessary mens rea because he was unaware that 
the barrel was shorter than 105 millimetres - the 
demarcation between a prohibited firearm and a 
restricted firearm under the Criminal Code. He never 
measured the the gun nor did he have a reason to 
believe it was 102.07 millimetres. Thus, he did not 
know that the firearm was “prohibited.”
Justice Blair, however, disagreed with the accused. 
In my view, the mens rea under s. 95(1) is 
satisfied where the offender knew that he or she 
was in possession of a loaded firearm.  
Knowledge of the length of the handgun’s barrel 
is not part of the mens rea required for the 
offence created by s. 95(1), and consequently, 
the trial judge erred in acquitting  the [accused] 
on this count.
Section 95(1) makes it an offence to possess “a 
loaded prohibited firearm or restricted firearm 
…,” unless the person possessing the firearm has 
a licence to do so and a registration certificate 
for the firearm. There are not two offences – 
possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, and 
possession of a loaded restricted firearm.  Rather, 
there is only one offence: possession of a loaded 
firearm, whether prohibited or 
restricted.  ... [paras. 12-13]
And further:
It is clear that s. 95(1) creates only 
one offence, the gravamen of 
which is the possession of a loaded 
firearm. It matters not whether the 
f i r e a r m i s “ p r o h i b i t e d ” o r 
“Knowledge that the barrel of 
the handgun measures 105 
millimetres, or more or less than 
that length – i.e., of whether 
the handgun is ‘prohibited’ or 
‘restricted’ – is immaterial.”
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“restricted.” The offence is the same. The 
potential penalties are the same under s. 95(2).  
The mens rea required for conviction under s. 
95(1), therefore, is simply knowledge by the 
offender that he or she is in possession of a 
firearm – in this case, a handgun – that is 
loaded.   Here, there is no doubt the [accused] 
knew he was in possession of a loaded handgun.  
It is therefore unnecessary to consider whether 
some other mental state – for example, wilful 
blindness – would be sufficient to establish 
“knowledge”.
This interpretation is consistent with the 
language of the Code and with the purpose of 
the provision and the intent of Parliament.  The 
offence created by s. 95(1) is designed to protect 
the public from the danger posed by people with 
loaded firearms. It is intended to catch all 
unauthorized loaded handguns.   A “prohibited 
firearm” – in the context of handguns – is 
defined in s. 84 as a handgun that has the 
characteristics set out therein. A “restricted 
firearm” is defined in s. 84 (again, in the context 
of handguns) to mean “a handgun that is not a 
prohibited firearm”.  Consequently, a handgun is 
either a restricted or a prohibited firearm. There 
are no other handguns under the Code. That is 
why the language forbids the possession of “a 
loaded prohibited firearm or restricted 
firearm” ....   [paras. 16-17]
Justice Blair also found the accused’s argument that 
the Crown must prove mens rea in relation to the 
type of weapon specified in the indictment would 
create an unwarranted hurdle for the Crown. :
Accused persons could always assert that they 
had not measured or made any enquiries about 
the length of the handgun’s barrel.   Accordingly, 
regardless of the way in which the charge is 
framed, the Crown would rarely, if ever, be able 
to obtain a conviction.  Where the charge is 
possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, the 
argument will be that the accused person did not 
know that the length of the barrel was 105 mm 
or less and therefore lacked the requisite mens 
rea that the gun was a prohibited firearm.  
Where the charge is possession of a loaded 
restricted firearm, the same argument would be 
made with respect to the length over 105 mm.  If 
the Crown charged possession of a loaded 
prohibited firearm or restricted firearm – 
adopting  the exact language of the offence 
created – the accused will submit that the Crown 
must prove knowledge of one or the other, but 
he or she just did not know either!  To give effect 
to the language and purpose of s. 95(1), and to 
the intention of Parliament, it is only necessary 
to give to the mens rea component its common 
sense meaning: the requisite mental element will 
be established where the Crown proves that the 
accused was knowingly in possession of a 
loaded prohibited or restricted handgun that he 
or she was not legally entitled to possess.  
Knowledge that the barrel of the handgun 
measures 105 millimetres, or more or less than 
that length – i.e., of whether the handgun is 
“prohibited” or “restricted” – is immaterial. 
[para. 18]
And further:
[U]nder s. 95(1) of the Code, the offence is the 
possession of a loaded firearm.  Whether the 
firearm is prohibited or restricted does not 
matter.  The common denominator in the 
comparison between the two types of offences is 
that the actus reus (possession of a forbidden 
item) and the mens rea (knowledge of the 
characteristics that make it a forbidden item) do 
not relate to different crimes but rather to the 
same crime in each case. [para. 21]
... ... ...
[T]he language of s. 95(1) creates only one 
offence: possession of a loaded firearm 
(prohibited or restricted).   Since a handgun – the 
loaded firearm in this instance – must by 
definition be either a prohibited or a restricted 
firearm, convicting the [accused] of the offence 
with which he was charged (possession of a 
loaded prohibited firearm) knowing that he was 
in possession of a loaded handgun, does not 
involve transferring to him an intention relevant 
to one crime in order to convict him of another. 
[para. 23]
The Crown’s appeal was allowed and a conviction 
was entered. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
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COLD CALLING SUSPECT DIAL-A-
DOPE NUMBER AMOUNTED TO 
ENTRAPMENT
R. v. Swan, 2009 BCCA 142
The accused was arrested following 
an undercover dial-a-dope operation. 
A police officer had compiled a list 
of telephone numbers that were 
suspected of being  associated to 
persons involved in dial-a-dope transactions. He 
emailed the entire police department and asked 
them to get names or phone numbers or the best tip 
they could on a dial-a-doper. The officer received 
150-250 telephone numbers (tips) which came in 
various ways; email, matchbooks, napkins, teared off 
pieces of paper,  Crimestoppers tips, or just a phone 
number on a piece of paper.  These numbers were 
then given to other officers working  on the project 
who would try and make a drug  deal and an arrest 
by calling  the telephone number and speaking  with 
whomever answered the call. Telephone calls based 
on these tips were 95% cold calls - made to an 
unknown person, unknown name, everything 
unknown from start to finish. The methodology 
followed is that the undercover officers make 
telephone calls to each number until they reach 
someone who will agree to sell them drugs.  They 
then arrange for a meet, exchange cash for drugs 
and arrest the seller. There was no set script for the 
initiating  telephone call, but the accused answered 
one of these calls. He said he was working  and the 
officer said he needed “40 up” - slang  for $40 worth 
of cocaine. The accused agreed to meet and 
provided the officer with powdered cocaine in 
exchange for $40. He was arrested and charged. 
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
accused plead guilty to trafficking  in cocaine and 
possessing  cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. 
However, he sought a judicial stay of proceedings 
on the basis that he was entrapped. The trial judge 
heard expert evidence that the dial-a-dope trade in 
illicit drugs is more anonymous, more mobile, and 
more difficult to investigate than “buy and bust” 
street level trafficking  which lends itself more readily 
to alternative police investigative techniques, 
including  surveillance.  The trial judge found the 
police conduct was reasonable and lawful and they 
were involved in a bona fide investigation. It did not 
amount to random virtue testing  and therefore was 
not entrapment.
The accused appealed to the British Columbia Court 
of Appeal arguing  the police entrapped him and that 
a judicial stay of proceedings should have been 
entered.  In his view, the police did not have a 
reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in drug 
trafficking  when they offered him an opportunity to 
commit the offences and, instead, were engaged in 
random virtue testing. He submitted the police were 
making  cold-calls on nothing  more than mere 
suspicion and that the police did not attempt to 
verify their sources before making  these calls, even 
where it was possible to do so, and that verification 
of tips was regarded as virtually irrelevant in such an 
investigation.  Because the police did not limit the 
scope or target area of the investigation to something 
narrower than everywhere within the cell phone’s 
reach or every number which happened to appear 
on the unsubstantiated police list of phone numbers, 
the police were not engaged in a bona fide 
investigation. The Crown, on the other hand, 
contended that the police conduct did not amount 
to random virtue testing  and that the investigation 
was bona fide.
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
ILLICIT DRUG TRADE
“[I]llicit drug trade in Canada is 
the source of much violence. 
Some of it involves vendors at 
war with one another over 
territory and perceived slights, and much of it 
involves those who are users committing 
offences up to the level of robbery in order to 
acquire the funds needed to support habits and 
addictions.” - Alberta Court of Appeal in R. v. 
Morris, 2009 ABCA 303 at para. 14.  
!!!"#$%&"'(
)
*+,-./0&0122-/03
4-,567-8-290:$$&
1;%<=>*1?=0@=A7@0>B7C0D=<D
!"#$ %&'$ (#)*+,#-$ .#/01$
2304$ !#56$ +5$ 0$ 5+781#$
7916+81#$ ,"3+,#$ :9+;$
4#5+/'#4$63$,"011#'/#$<39)$
9'4#)560'4+'/$ 3=$ 6"#$ 10>?$
@0,"$:9#56+3'$+5$A05#4$3'$0$,05#$=#069)#4$+'$6"+5$+559#?$
(##$80/#$BB$=3)$6"#$0'5>#)5?
C?$D11$3,,980'65$3=$0$*#"+,1#$0)#$8)#59786+*#1<$4#60+'#4$
>"#'$6"#$*#"+,1#$+5$56388#4$=3)$0$6)0==+,$*+3106+3'E
$ F0G$!)9#
$ FAG$H015#
$
I?$D5J+'/$0$4)+*#)$63$A13>$+'63$0'$3==+,#)K5$=0,#$=3)$6"#$
89)835#$ 3=$ 4#6#)7+'+'/$ 6"#$ 539),#$ 3=$ 0'$ 01,3"31$
3439)$+5$0$8#)7+55+A1#$5,)##'+'/$6#,"'+:9#$0'4$43#5$
'36$#'/0/#$6"#$)+/"6$63$,39'5#1$9'4#)$5?CLFAG$3=$6"#$$
M"0)6#)?
$ F0G$!)9#
$ FAG$H015#
$
B?$ N"+,"$ 8)3*+',#$ "04$ 6"#$ 7356$ 088#015$ A#=3)#$ 6"#$
(98)#7#$M39)6$3=$M0'040$+'$ILLOE$$
$ F0G$P)+6+5"$M3197A+0Q$
$ FAG$D1A#)60Q
$ F,G$R'60)+3Q
$ F4G$S9#A#,?
T?$!"#$+'=3)706+3'01$496<$+7835#4$3'$6"#$831+,#$9'4#)$
5?CLFAG$3=$6"#$M"0)6#)$+5$63$/+*#$6"#$4#60+'#4$8#)53'$
'36+,#$ 3=$ 6"#+)$ )+/"65U$ '36$ 63$ 6#11$ 6"#7$ "3>$ 63$
#V#),+5#$6"#7?$
$ F0G$!)9#
$ FAG$H015#
W?$D$831+,#$3==+,#)$'##4$'36$70J#$0$5?IWTFIG$M)+7+'01$
M34#$ 088)3*#4$ 5,)##'+'/$ 4#*+,#$ 4#70'4$
+'560'60'#3951<$983'$4+5,3*#)+'/$6"06$6"#$4)+*#)$"05$
01,3"31$ +'$ 6"#+)$ A34<U$ A96$ 5"3914$ 43$ 53$ 8)37861<$
0=6#)$6"#$)#:9+5+6#$5958+,+3'$+5$=3)7#4?$
$ F0G$!)9#
$ FAG$H015#
X?$ N"+,"$ 3=$ 6"#$ =3113>+'/$ >05$ 6"#$ 7356$ =)#:9#'6$
3==#',#$+'$04916$,)+7+'01$,39)6$+'$ILLXYILLOE
$$$$F0G$+780+)#4$4)+*+'/Q$
$ FAG$6"#=6Q
$ F,G$=)094Q
$ F4G$A)#0,"$3=$8)3A06+3'Q
$ F#G$4)9/$8355#55+3'?
!"#$!!%&'("$)*+#,
!"#$%&'()#'%*+,-.'-/+0#)*1)&1
23$-+#&')4+5"16-+$)7+#%+8%*7'1-&+/$-#$-&+#$-&-+
'7+7"99'8'-*#+ &-4'):4-+ '*9%&;)#'%*+%*+ #$-+:)7'7+
%9+ /$'8$+ #$-+ )"#$%&'('*6+ 5"16-+ 8%"41+ $).-+
6&)*#-1+#$-+)"#$%&'()#'%*<+
3$-+)"#$%&'('*6+ 5"16-+;"7#+:-+7)#'79'-1+#$)#+
#$-&-+)&-+&-)7%*):4-+)*1+=&%:):4-+6&%"*17+#%+:-4'-.-+#$)#+)*+
%99-*8-+$)7+:--*>+'7+:-'*6>+%&+'7+):%"#+#%+:-+8%;;'##-1>+)*1+
#$)#+ #$-+ )"#$%&'()#'%*+ 7%"6$#+ /'44+ )99%&1+ -.'1-*8-+ %9+ #$)#+
%99-*8-<+?%/-.-&>+#$-+#&')4+5"16-+1%-7+*%#+7#)*1+'*+#$-+7$%-7+
%9+ #$-+ )"#$%&'('*6+ 5"16-+ /$-*+ 8%*1"8#'*6+ #$-+ &-.'-/<+ 3$-+
@"-7#'%*+9%&+#$-+#&')4+5"16-+'7+/$-#$-&+#$-&-+/)7+)*A+:)7'7+%*+
/$'8$+ #$-+ )"#$%&'('*6+ 5"16-+ 8%"41+ $).-+ 6&)*#-1+ #$-+
)"#$%&'()#'%*<+
3$-+#&')4+5"16-+7$%"41+%*4A+7-#+)7'1-+)*+)"#$%&'()#'%*+'9+7)#'79'-1+
%*+)44+#$-+;)#-&')4+=&-7-*#-1>+)*1+%*+8%*7'1-&'*6+B#$-+#%#)4'#A+
%9+#$-+8'&8";7#)*8-7C>+ #$)#+#$-&-+/)7+*%+:)7'7+%*+/$'8$+#$-+
)"#$%&'()#'%*+8%"41+:-+7"7#)'*-1<++3$-+#&')4+5"16-C7+9"*8#'%*+'7+
#%+ -D);'*-+ #$-+ 7"==%&#'*6+ )99'1).'#+ )7+ )+ /$%4->+ )*1+ *%#+ #%+
7":5-8#+'#+#%+)+B;'8&%78%='8+)*)4A7'7<CE+F+G&'#'7$+H%4";:')+H%"&#+
%9+!==-)4+H$'-9+I"7#'8-+J'*8$>+!"#$"#%&&#'()#*'+,#KLLM+GHH!+
KNL>+)#+=)&)7<+OKFON>+&-9-&-*8-7+%;'##-1<+
'-$)"+&.$.%&'%+/012"&
3$.4'*5"&-"$/&60$42$7&
81+9"0"+8"
1:;<=>?&@ABC&DEEF
!"#$ (#*#'6"$ Z3)6"$ D7#)+,0'$ M3'=#)#',#$ 3'$ ("0J#'$
P0A<$(<'4)37#YDA95+*#$[#04$!)0970$+5$A#+'/$"#14$3'$
R,63A#)$ W\OU$ ILL]$ +'$ A#096+=91$ ^0',39*#)U$ P)+6+5"$
M3197A+0?$!"+5$<#0)U$3*#)$CLL$58#,+01+;#4$#V8#)65$>+11$
A#$8)#5#'6+'/$=)37$0)39'4$6"#$>3)14U$+',194+'/$0$56)3'/$
1#/01$6)0,J?$
EEF?0>/2GH/I92EE$_)#*#'6$("0J#'$P0A<$(<'4)37#$PM$
"05$ 0))0'/#4$ 0$ /)398$ )06#$ )#49,6+3'$ =3)$ 011$ PM$
8)3=#55+3'015$ 0'4$ 80)#'65?$ !"#$ /)398$ )06#$ =3)$ PM$
066#'4##5$+5$3'1<$`CWL$a(b$=3)$6"#$=911$6")##$40<5$3=$
6)0+'+'/?$$N"#'$)#/+56#)+'/U$9'4#)$c)398$M34#$#'6#)$PM$
c)398$206#$63$)#,#+*#$6"#$4+5,39'6#4$)06#?$
H3)$ 73)#$ +'=3)706+3'$ 81#05#$ *+5+6$
GGGHI<J;KLMN>H<?OP:<JQ>?>J:>DEEF
www.10-8.c
Volume 9 Issue 5 - September/October 2009
PAGE 16
Entrapment
Justice Prowse, writing  the opinion of the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal, first reviewed the law of 
entrapment.  The defence of entrapment “is based on 
the notion that limits should be imposed on the 
ability of the police to participate in the commission 
of an offence” and that, “[a]s a general rule, it is 
expected in our society that the police will direct 
their attention towards uncovering  criminal activity 
that occurs without their involvement”. The defence 
of entrapment is available in two ways:
1. the authorities provide a person with an 
opportunity to commit an offence without acting 
on a reasonable suspicion that this person is 
already engaged in criminal activity or pursuant 
to a bona fide inquiry. A reasonable suspicion is 
something  more than a mere suspicion but 
something  less than a belief based upon 
reasonable grounds.  And the “‘reasonable 
suspicion’ must exist either with respect to the 
person being  targeted, or with respect to the area 
being  targeted.” A bona fide inquiry involves the 
police presenting  the opportunity to commit a 
particular crime to persons who are associated 
with a location where it is reasonably suspected 
that criminal activity is taking  place. In these 
cases, the police may not know the identity of 
specific individuals, but they may know a 
particular location or area where it is reasonably 
suspected that certain criminal activity is 
occurring  making  it permissible to provide 
opportunities to people associated with the 
location under suspicion, even if these people are 
not themselves under 
suspicion.  This type of 
r a n d o m n e s s i s 
permissible within the 
scope of a bona fide 
inquiry. The defence 
b e a r s t h e o n u s o f 
establishing  entrapment 
by proving, on a balance 
of probabilities, that 
there was no reasonable 
suspicion nor a bona fide 
inquiry; or
2. although having  such a reasonable suspicion or 
acting  in the course of a bona fide inquiry, the 
police go beyond providing  an opportunity and 
induce the commission of the offence.  
Random virtue-testing, on the other hand, arises 
when a police officer presents a person with the 
opportunity to commit an offence without a 
reasonable suspicion that:
• the person is already engaged in the particular 
criminal activity, or
• the physical location with which the person is 
associated is a place where the particular 
criminal activity is likely occurring. 
Here, just because the investigating  officer received 
a telephone number from the list did not give rise to 
a reasonable suspicion that the person who 
answered the phone was engaged in drug-related 
activity.  Rather, this piece of information, at best, 
amounted to “mere suspicion.” It was only after the 
accused’s response to the officer’s request for “40 
up” - which was a solicitation for cocaine - that the 
police were acting  on something  more than a mere 
suspicion. But the reasonable suspicion must be 
present before the officer offers the accused the 
opportunity to commit the offence, not after she 
offers him the opportunity to do so.  Nor were the 
police acting on a bona fide investigation: 
It is not for the judiciary to direct the police how 
to conduct their operations.   The judiciary is 
required, however, to determine whether the 
police conduct in a given case has overstepped 
the balance ... between the state’s right to 
investigate and enforce the law, 
and the public’s right to be left 
alone.
In considering that balance, 
what degree of comfort should 
the public take from the fact that 
the calls made are only to those 
numbers which make their way 
on to a police list?  It is tempting 
to think that the numbers would 
not be on the list unless there 
was a reasonable suspicion that 
the numbers could be matched 
“It is not for the judiciary to direct 
the police how to conduct their 
operations.  The judiciary is 
required, however, to determine 
whether the police conduct in a given 
case has overstepped the balance ... 
between the state’s right to 
investigate and enforce the law, and 
the public’s right to be left alone.”
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with an individual linked to the drug trade.   But 
we know that is not so.  The best that can be said 
is that the numbers are linked to individuals 
about whom there may be only a mere suspicion 
that they may be involved in the drug trade. As 
far as the undercover operator making  the call is 
concerned, that suspicion arises solely from the 
fact that the telephone number is on the list.  
Thus, a form of circular reasoning, or 
bootstrapping  governs the investigation whereby 
the results obtained are taken as justification for 
the means employed.  ... [references omitted, 
paras. 38-39]
And further:
I accept that dial-a-dope investigations present 
different problems in terms of detection and 
e n f o rc e m e n t t h a n t h e b u y a n d b u s t 
investigations ... . I also agree with the trial judge 
that the police in this investigation were 
operating bona fides to the extent they were 
conducting their operations with the genuine 
goal of pursuing  serious crime, namely the 
trafficking  in hard drugs, without ulterior 
motives.  I conclude, however, that in pursuing 
their goal, they overstepped the bounds of a 
bona fide police investigation ... by proceeding 
armed only with mere suspicion and the hope 
that their unknown targets will provide the 
“something more” which was a necessary 
precursor to the invitation to traffic in 
drugs.  They pursued their investigative goals in 
circumstances where more information was, or 
could have been, available to them, but which 
they chose to disregard for reasons of 
expediency. [references omitted, para. 43]
Since the police did not have a reasonable suspicion 
the accused was engaged in trafficking  drugs or were 
acting  pursuant to a bona fide inquiry, the accused 
was entrapped and was entitled to a stay of 
proceedings. The accused’s appeal was allowed, the 
convictions set aside, and a judicial stay of 
proceedings was entered. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
NO ‘SEARCH’ IN UNDERCOVER 
DRUG BUY
R. v. Baldasaro, 2009 ONCA 676
Two Reverend Brothers were 
convicted of several counts of 
trafficking  in marihuana in the 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice. 
They were sentenced to terms of 
imprisonment and forfeiture ordered of $2,100 in 
cash and the Assembly of the Church of the 
Universe, which professed marihuana to be 
sacramental. They appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing, among  other grounds, that the 
police were obligated to obtain a search warrant 
before entering  onto their  property to purchase 
marihuana. “The undercover officers were expressly 
invited into the premises for the purpose of 
purchasing  marihuana,” said the Court in rejecting 
the appeal. “And it is settled law that undercover 
drug  buys do not constitute a ‘search’ under section 
8 of the Charter.”
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
POST CONVICTION DNA 
COLLECTION INVOLVES 
REDUCED PRIVACY INTEREST
R. v. Morris, 2009 ABCA 303
The accused was arrested after 
police called a drug  traffickers cell 
phone number and arranged to 
purchase crack cocaine. The 
accused attended the pre-arranged 
location on a bicycle and was found to be in 
possession of pre-packaged crack cocaine. He was 
also subject to a conditional sentence order that 
required him to, among  other things, not possess a 
controlled substance or a cell phone. He plead 
guilty to possession for the purpose of trafficking  and 
received two years in jail, but the judge refused to 
impose a DNA order. In the judge’s view, taking 
bodily substances was the ultimate, or at least a very 
serious, intrusion into bodily integrity and ordering www.10-8.ca
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one in this case was not in the best interests of the 
administration of justice.
A Crown Appeal to the Alberta Court of Appeal was 
successful. “The sentencing  judge erred in law by 
holding  that the collection of a DNA sample 
following  a conviction is an affront to the security 
and personal integrity of an offender,” said the 
Court. “In coming  to this conclusion, the sentencing 
judge relied on cases that relate to the collection of 
bodily samples from an accused person rather than 
cases relating  to post-conviction collection of DNA. 
Simply put, one’s privacy interest post-conviction is 
reduced.” Having  applied the correct law on the 
issue of intrusion and considering  the accused’s 
criminal record and the nature of the underlying 
offence, the Appeal Court granted the DNA order.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
REASONABLE NOTICE IN 
SERVING DRUG CERTIFICATE 
DEPENDS ON CIRCUMSTANCES
R. v. Yonis, 2009 ABCA 336
A police officer attended the 
accused’s lawyer’s office. The lawyer 
was not there, but the officer told the 
receptionist that he had certificates 
of analysis that were required to be 
served. The receptionist telephoned the lawyer and 
was overheard by the officer  say the police wished 
to serve certificates of analysis on the accused. 
Counsel was overheard to tell the receptionist, 
“that’s fine”. Three certificates of analysis, that did 
not on their face reference the accused, were left 
with the receptionist. There was no written notice of 
intention to produce the certificates in evidence, but 
the officer said it was the Crown’s intention to 
submit the certificates in evidence “next Thursday”.
At trial in Alberta Provincial Court on cocaine 
trafficking  charges the judge ruled that what the 
officer overheard in the telephone conversation 
between the receptionist and counsel was hearsay 
and could not used. He found the receptionist did 
not have authority to accept service of the 
certificates on behalf of the accused and the 
certificates were excluded. The Crown failed to 
prove, under s.51 of the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act, that it had served the accused with 
copies of the certificates together with reasonable 
prior notice of the Crown’s intention to offer the 
certificates in evidence at trial. The accused was 
acquitted on three counts of cocaine trafficking. 
The Crown appealed to the Alberta Court of Appeal 
arguing, in part, the service of the certificates upon 
the law office of the accused’s counsel complied 
with s.51 and it was not dependent upon the 
consent of counsel to being  so served. Further, the 
Crown submitted that the officer’s evidence as to 
what he heard of the telephone conversation 
between counsel and the receptionist was 
admissible to establish the authority of the 
receptionist to accept service of the certificates on 
behalf of the accused.
What amounts to “reasonable notice” under s.51 
will depend on the circumstances. “We do not 
doubt that compliance with section 51 of the Act 
can be achieved by effecting  service upon defence 
counsel acting  for an accused,” said the Appeal 
Court. “It is reasonable to assume that counsel’s 
retainer is wide enough to include service.” The 
Court continued:
There may be circumstances in which service of 
reasonable notice of intention, together with a 
copy of the certificate, may be made upon a law 
office. One such circumstance is with the 
lawyer’s knowledge and consent. However, we 
do not wish to genera l ize as to the 
circumstances in which service on the law office 
is adequate, especially as case law indicates that 
notice of intention may sometimes be given 
orally. We think it would be the rare occasion 
when mere oral notice, and the delivery of 
certificates upon a receptionist, or other 
secretarial staff of a law office of an accused’s 
lawyer, would suffice. On the other hand, the 
service of appropriate written notice, together 
with the copy of a certificate, upon the law 
office of defence counsel acting for an accused 
may be adequate in certain circumstances. 
[para. 12]
Volume 9 Issue 5 - September/October 2009
PAGE 19
And Further:
Section 51 requires that the party intending  to 
rely on the certificates give reasonable notice of 
its intention to produce the certificates at trial, as 
well as providing copies of the certificates. 
Service of certificates with reasonable notice of 
intention has been the “bread and butter” 
activity of drug prosecutions in Alberta for 
decades. It is not difficult for the federal Crown 
to create, and use, an adequate and informative 
style of written notice of intention that 
incorporates the relevant certificates by 
reference, and then to effect service of the 
written notice and copies of the certificates 
either upon the accused personally, or upon 
defence counsel acting for the accused. This 
latter service can be effected either personally, 
or by service upon a person at his law office 
authorized to accept service of documents. 
[para. 14]
But in this case the Appeal Court upheld the trial 
judge’s decision. “The oral advice to the receptionist 
given following  the telephone conversation between 
her and the lawyer, merely that the certificates were 
intended to be submitted ‘next Thursday,’ falls short 
of reasonable notice of intention to produce the 
certificates at the [accused’s] trial,” said the Court. 
The Crown’s Appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
NEW CRIMES AGAINST COPS 
ADDED TO CRIMINAL CODE
Effective October 2, 2009 two new provisions were 
added to the Criminal Code regarding  assaults 
against peace officers. In addition to s.270 which 
makes it a dual offence with a maximum penalty of 
five years in prison to assault a “peace officer 
engaged in the execution of his duty or a person 
acting  in aid of such an officer” or to assault “a 
person with intent to resist or prevent the lawful 
arrest or detention of himself or another person,” the 
offences of assaulting  a peace officer with a weapon 
or causing  bodily harm and aggravated assault 
against a peace officer are now in effect. 
Assaulting  peace officer with weapon or 
causing bodily harm
Under s.270.01 there is now a new offence for 
assaulting  a peace officer with a weapon or causing 
bodily harm. It reads:
Aggravated assault of peace officer
As well, s.270.02 also creates the offence of 
aggravated assault against a peace officer:
But note the punishments themselves are no greater 
than for similar assaults against non peace officers 
(see ss. 267 and 268 of the Criminal Code). 
s. 51 Controlled Drugs & Substances Act
(1) Subject to this section, a certificate or report 
prepared by an analyst under subsection 45(2) is 
admissible in evidence in any prosecution for an 
offence under this Act or the regulations or any other 
Act of Parliament and, in the absence of evidence to 
the contrary, is proof of the statements set out in the 
certificate or report, without proof of the signature or 
official character of the person appearing to have 
signed it.
... ... ... 
(3) Unless the court otherwise orders, no certificate 
or report shall be received in evidence under 
subsection (1) unless the party intending to produce 
it has, before its production at trial, given to the 
party against whom it is intended to be produced 
reasonable notice of that intention, together with a 
copy of the certificate or report.
s.270.01 (1) Everyone commits an offence who, in 
committing an assault referred to in section 270,
(a) carries,  uses or threatens to use a weapon or an 
imitation of one; or
(b) causes bodily harm to the complainant.
Punishment
(2)  Everyone who commits an offence under subsection (1) 
is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a 
term of not more than 10 years; or
(b)  an offence punishable on summary conviction and 
liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 18 
months.
s.270.02 Everyone who, in committing  an assault referred 
to in section 270, wounds, maims, disfigures or endangers 
the life of  the complainant is guilty of an indictable 
offence and  liable to imprisonment for a term of not more 
than 14 years.
  
 
 
 
 
 
  Asset Forfeiture - Offence Related Property and Civil Forfeiture 
 
Date:  Monday, November 16, 2009 
Time:   10 am to 12 noon 
Location:   Shadbolt Centre for the Arts – Studio 102 
  6450 Deer Lake Avenue, Bby 
Session Overview 
The Provincial Civil Forfeiture Office and the Vancouver Police Department are presenting a two hour training 
session for police executives and senior police managers on the forfeiture of criminally tainted assets. 
   
Rob Kroeker, Executive Director of the BC Civil Forfeiture Office will present a session on British Columbia’s Civil 
Forfeiture Act.   
 
Inspector Brad Desmarais, of the Vancouver Police Department, Gangs and Drugs section will present a 
session on criminal forfeiture, focusing on the use of offence related property provisions in section 490 of the 
Criminal Code. 
 
Participants will develop a working knowledge of criminal and civil forfeiture law from a management 
perspective.  The session will speak to the resource draw associated to pursuing either criminal or civil 
forfeiture, Crown and CFO requirements for asset forfeiture cases, recommended organizational 
protocols for file referrals, information sharing, and expected outcomes.  Drug, gang, proceeds, fraud, 
securities and financial crime section managers will find these sessions of particular interest. 
 
Who Should Attend?  This session will be of interest to senior police officials (inspector and above) 
responsible for the investigation of files involving property suspected of being obtained through crime in 
any form, or responsible for organizational strategies in response to gang, drug and financially 
motivated crimes. 
 
Cost: This session is sponsored by the Civil Forfeiture Office.  Registration is free to police or other 
sworn law enforcement officers serving in British Columbia.  Members and member organizations are 
responsible for any travel, accommodation or other costs associated with attending.  
 
Registration:    
Email:   Karen Albrecht at advancedpolicetraining@jibc.ca 
 
Coffee and muffins will be served at 9:30am. 
Advanced Programs
SPECIAL PRESENTATION
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The Fraser Valley Criminal Justice Conference will be held at the Ramada Plaza and 
Conference Centre in Abbotsford, British Columbia from April 27-30, 2010. The 2010 
Conference Topic is “Youth, Communities and the Criminal Justice System.” Speakers 
will include Supt. Dan Malo, Andrée Cazabon, Dr. Irwin Cohen, Dr. Matt Logan, Crystal Meth 
Society, Glen Flett, Dr. Lohrasbe, Sgt. Chris Thompson, Rosalind Currie, D/Chief Rick Lucy, 
Diane Sowden, Dr. Ray Corrado, Mary Ellen O'Toole, Det. Judy Dizy, Det. Chris Eeg, Gil 
Johnston, and Victor Porter. For more information visit:
www.fvcjc.ca
SUBJECTIVE BELIEF FOR ARREST 
CAN BE INFERRED FROM 
EVIDENCE
R. v. Dill, 2009 ABCA 332
Following  his arrest for possessing  a 
stolen licence plate, the accused was 
searched and methamphetamine was 
found in his jacket pocket. At trial in 
Alberta Provincial 
Court the accused was acquitted of 
possessing  the stolen licence plate 
but he was convicted of possessing 
methamphetamine for the purpose 
of trafficking. Although he was 
acquitted on the licence plate 
possession charge, the trial judge 
nonetheless found reasonable 
grounds existed for the arrest and 
the search that followed was 
incident to arrest. 
The accused appealed his conviction to the Alberta 
Court of Appeal arguing, in part, that the trial judge 
erred in finding  a breach of s.8 of the Charter (search 
and seizure). He submitted that the trial judge, 
among other things, misapplied the test for 
reasonable grounds, drew unreasonable inferences 
from the evidence, failed to appreciate relevant 
evidence, and considered circumstances unknown 
to the arresting  officer. In his view, the trial judge 
considered an amalgam of evidence from different 
officers, some of which was 
conflicting, in considering 
w h e t h e r t h e r e w e r e 
reasonable and probable 
grounds for his arrest. As 
well, he asserted that the 
trial judge should only 
have considered what the 
arresting  officer knew and 
believed at the time of the 
arrest. Further, he said the 
trial judge erred in finding 
“In considering whether reasonable 
and probable grounds existed, the 
trial judge was entitled to consider 
the totality of the evidence, 
including the fact that there was 
more than one police officer 
involved in the decision to pursue, 
stop and arrest the [accused].”
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a subjective basis for the arrest in the absence of 
evidence from the arresting  officer that he believed 
the accused was in possession of a stolen license 
plate and in finding  an objective basis for the arrest 
by considering  circumstances that were not known 
to the arresting officer.
Justice Costigan, delivering  the judgment on behalf 
of the Court, rejected the accused’s arguments. The 
standard of judicial review relating  to reasonable 
grounds is clear:
• a trial judge’s factual findings are entitled to 
deference; and
• the application of a legal standard to the facts is a 
question of law (reviewable on the correctness 
standard). 
In finding  the trial judge did not err, the Appeal 
Court stated:
... In considering whether reasonable and 
probable grounds existed, the trial judge was 
entitled to consider the totality of the evidence, 
including  the fact that there was more than one 
police officer involved in the decision to pursue, 
stop and arrest the [accused]. The fact that there 
may have been inconsistencies in the evidence 
of the police officers as to what they observed at 
the time of arrest might have an impact on 
whether a reasonable doubt exists but it does not 
detract from the reasonable and probable 
grounds of the officers at the scene. The reason 
for the arrest is obvious on this record.
In these circumstances, it was not a reviewable 
error for the trial judge to infer that the arresting 
officer subjectively believed that the [accused] 
had committed an offence. Nor was it an error 
for her to find that the evidence supplied an 
objective basis for that belief. Once the arrest 
was made, [the officer] was justified in 
conducting a search incidental to the arrest. ... 
[paras. 6-7]
There was no breach of s. 8 of the Charter and the 
accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca      
‘FINDS COMMITTING’ MEANS 
‘APPARENTLY FINDS 
COMMITTING’
R. v. S.T.P., 2009 NSCA 86
Two officers were on patrol as part 
of a response to violent incidents, 
including  fire bombings,  that had 
taken place in the area. They were 
instructed to show a police presence 
in the community and generally  get to know the 
people of the area. They saw a vehicle being  driven 
with three young  males in it. The accused was in the 
back seat of a car, appeared to take notice of them 
and quickly turn around. The vehicle then turned off 
the street, at the first opportunity, into a fast food 
outlet. The vehicle’s licence plate was checked and 
determined that on two occasions it had been 
associated with bail violations, once about two and 
a half months earlier and again two days before, 
including  a reference to “trafficking  cannabis”. This 
computer check simply meant that the vehicle had 
in some way be connected to such violations, but 
did not determine whether any individual in the car 
or even the owner had been associated in any way 
with a bail violation. 
The officers entered the parking  lot and parked 
behind the car which was still occupied. They 
approached the car and could detect the smell of 
burned marijuana coming  from it. The youths were 
arrested and, incidental to their arrest, were 
searched. No marijuana was found in the vehicle 
and the youths denied smoking  any that evening. 
But police found cocaine in the accused’s pockets. 
He was charged with possessing  cocaine for the 
purpose of trafficking.
At trial in Nova Scotia Provincial Court the accused 
made a Charter application to exclude the cocaine. 
The trial judge, however, found the arrest lawful. The 
circumstances of the encounter, including  the smell 
of marihuana, justified the arrest. As a result, the 
search that followed was incidental to a lawful arrest 
and there was no Charter violation. The accused was 
convicted for the drug offence. 
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The accused appealed to the 
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal 
a r gu ing  t he po l i c e had 
insufficient grounds to arrest 
him because the smell of burnt 
marijuana was indicative of no 
more than possession at some 
time in the past. Thus, the arrest was unlawful as was 
the search that flowed from the arrest. 
Chief Justice MacDonald, authoring  the opinion of 
the Appeal Court, first considered a peace officers 
power of arrest under s.495(1) of the Criminal Code. 
Although the offence of possessing  marihuana is a 
dual offence, it is strictly summary if the amount 
involved is less than 30 grams. In deciding  whether 
the arrest in this case was lawful, the Court assumed, 
without deciding, that the police would need to find 
the accused committing  the offence (possession of 
marihuana) if the arrest was to be lawful. Section 
495(1)(b) reads: 
In discussing  how this arrest provision applied to the 
case at hand, Chief Justice MacDonald stated:
At first blush, this may appear to be a challenge 
considering the fact that no marijuana was ever 
found. However that does not end the matter. It 
was still open to the judge to conclude that s. 
495(1)(b) had been complied with in these 
circumstances. I say this because courts in this 
country have consistently interpreted the 
reference to “finds committing” in s. 495(1)(b) to 
mean apparently finds committing. ... [para. 18]
After reviewing  several case authorities, the Court 
concluded:
[I]n my view an arresting officer must establish  
three things in order to meet the finds 
committing standard.  Firstly, the police officer’s 
knowledge must be contemporaneous to the 
event. Thus he or she   must be present while the 
apparent offence is taking place. In other words, 
unlike the reasonable and probable grounds 
standard, it is not enough to believe that an 
offence has taken place in 
the past or is about to take 
place. 
Secondly, the officer must 
actually observe or detect 
the commission of the 
offence. Most often this is 
achieved by actually seeing  and/or hearing  the 
offence being committed. However, I would not 
limit it to those two senses. In fact, as in this 
case, the sense of smell may suffice. ...
Thirdly, there must be an objective basis for the 
officer’s conclusion that an offence is being 
committed.  In other words, ... “it must be 
‘apparent’ to a reasonable person placed in the 
circumstances of the arresting  officer at the 
time”. [references omitted, paras. 20-22]
Although the Court agreed that the smell of burnt 
marihuana alone may not justify an arrest, the trial 
judge relied on more than that fact in finding  the 
arrest lawful - “many more factors coalesced to 
justify the arrest.” In looking  at the whole picture as 
it presented itself to the police the Court concluded: 
[C]onsider this context. The officers see three 
young  men in a vehicle and one of them appears 
nervous upon seeing the police vehicle. Their 
car then immediately turns off the road into the 
McDonald’s parking  lot. Then a computer check 
of the vehicle reveals “bail violations” including 
references to “cannabis”. This would have given 
the officers strong  reason to believe that 
something illicit was occurring. Then upon 
smelling burnt marijuana, it became apparent 
that the illicit activity involved the possession of 
marijuana.   At that point, the test for a summary 
conviction arrest was met. Specifically, applying 
the three criteria noted above: (a) the officer was  
present when the apparent offence was taking 
place, (b) he detected the smell of burnt 
marijuana, and (c) the commission of this 
offence would have been “‘apparent’ to a 
reasonable person placed in the circumstances 
of the arresting officer at the time”.
The arrest was lawful and the accused’s appeal was 
dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
A peace officer may arrest without warrant ... (b) a 
person whom he finds committing  a criminal 
offence ... .
“[C]ourts ... have consistently 
interpreted the reference to “finds 
committing” in s. 495(1)(b) to mean 
apparently finds committing.”
Volume 9 Issue 5 - September/October 2009
PAGE 24
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES 
INCIDENTAL TO ARREST DO NOT 
DEPEND ON EXIGENCIES
R. v. Tontarelli, 2009 NBCA 52   
Two police officers wearing  plain 
clothes attended a large convenience 
store, restaurant and gas station to 
meet a source.  While waiting  in the 
parking  lot a GMC Jimmy drove 
slowly by with the driver checking  one of the officers 
out and making  eye contact. After parking  the Jimmy 
nearby, the driver remained seated behind the 
wheel. The driver appeared “nervous” as he scanned 
the parking  lot, seemingly looking  for someone or 
something. After about 10 
minutes the officers left the 
area and returned some 15 
minutes later. The officers 
noted the Jimmy had been 
moved - it was now backed 
into a spot and afforded its 
driver an unobstructed view 
of the area ahead. Within a 
few minutes a Pontiac G6 
arrived. It was confirmed to 
be a rental vehicle and was 
driven by the accused who was the sole occupant. 
He walked to the Jimmy and entered its passenger 
compartment. 
The two men in the Jimmy engaged in a 
conversation which lasted 15-20 minutes. It ended 
with a handshake, followed by the accused’s exit 
with a black duffle bag  and a smaller bag, which he 
immediately placed in the trunk of his car. The 
accused entered the convenience store and was seen 
exit with two other men. They entered the G6 but 
now a different man, not the accused, was driving. 
Believing  there had been a drug  transaction, the 
police pulled over both vehicles after they left the 
parking  lot. The drivers of both vehicles were 
arrested and the vehicles searched. The police 
opened the G6’s trunk, finding  20 individually 
wrapped bundles of marihuana in the black duffle 
bag. Each bundle weighed about one-half pound, for 
a total of approximately 10 pounds, were seized 
from the black duffle bag. No controlled drug  or 
substance was found in the other smaller bag. From 
the Jimmy police seized $16,000 in cash and a small 
amount of marihuana. 
At trial in New Brunswick Provincial Court police 
testified that they believed a drug  transaction had 
taken place in the parking  lot based on experience 
and the “totality of the circumstances”. The vehicle 
was then searched as an incident to the arrest of the 
G6 driver. In the officer’s mind the law permitted a 
warrantless search, even where there were no 
exigent circumstances, for the purposes of (1) police 
safety and (2) the need to secure evidence pertaining 
to the suspected drug  transaction. The trial judge 
found the arrest of the G6 driver was lawful and the 
search that followed was 
incidental to arrest. Even 
though there were no safety 
issues because the arrestees 
were well secured, the police 
were gathering  evidence of 
illegal possession of drugs. 
The marihuana seized from 
the G6 was admissible in 
evidence and the accused 
was found guilty of trafficking 
i n m a r i h u a n a . H e wa s 
sentenced to 28 months  in jail, a DNA sample was 
ordered, and a firearms prohibition was imposed. 
The accused appealed to the New Brunswick Court 
of Appeal arguing, in part, that the warrantless 
search of the car was not authorized at law.   In his 
view, the lack of exigent circumstances rendered the 
warrantless search unreasonable under s.8  of the 
Charter. In other words, he suggested that the 
common law power to search a vehicle incident to 
the driver’s arrest could only be lawfully exercised 
under exigent circumstances. 
Exigent Circumstances
Chief Justice Drapeau, writing  the unanimous 
judgment, found the lawful exercise of that common 
law power was not conditional upon the existence 
of exigent circumstances - circumstances indicative 
of “an imminent danger of the loss, removal, 
“‘[E]xigent circumstances’ are not 
required for the lawful exercise of the 
common law power of search incident 
to lawful arrest where ... the place to 
be searched is a motor vehicle on a 
public highway and the person 
arrested is the driver.”
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destruction or disappearance of the evidence if the 
search or seizure is delayed” - making  it 
impracticable for the police to obtain a warrant. 
“‘[E]xigent circumstances’ are not required for the 
lawful exercise of the common law power of search 
incident to lawful arrest where, as here, the place to 
be searched is a motor vehicle on a public highway 
and the person arrested is the driver,” said Chief 
Justice Drapeau. 
Although, as a general rule, warrantless searches are 
presumptively unreasonable for s.8  purposes, the 
burden of establishing  the reasonableness of any 
warrantless search can be discharged by the Crown 
if:
(1) the law authorized the search; 
(2) the authorizing  law was itself reasonable; 
and
(3) the search was executed in a reasonable 
manner. 
The common law power of search incident to arrest, 
however, is a well-established exception to the 
ordinary requirements for a reasonable search 
because it requires neither a warrant nor 
independent reasonable and probable grounds. “In 
my view ... exigent circumstances are not a 
prerequisite to the lawful exercise of the common 
law power of search incident to arrest in 
circumstances such as those revealed by the present 
record,” said Chief Justice Drapeau.  
Application of s.11(7) CDSA
Section 11(7) of the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act, as noted by the Court, did not 
diminish the scope of the common law power to 
search on arrest. The Court stated:
Section 11(7) allows a peace officer to exercise, 
without a warrant, the search power described in 
s. 11(1) if two prerequisites are met: (1) the 
conditions for obtaining  a warrant exist; and (2) 
exigent circumstances make it impracticable to 
obtain one.  Section 11(1) provides for the 
issuance of a warrant authorizing the search of a 
“place” for a controlled substance and its seizure 
s.11 Controlled Drugs & Substances Act
(1) A justice who, on ex parte application, is satisfied by 
information on  oath that there are reasonable grounds 
to believe that
(a) a controlled substance or precursor in respect of 
which this Act has been contravened,
(b) any thing  in which  a controlled  substance or 
precursor referred to in paragraph (a) is contained or 
concealed,
(c) offence-related property, or
(d) any thing that will afford evidence in respect of an 
offence under this Act or an offence, in whole or in part 
in  relation to a contravention of this Act, under section 
354 or 462.31 of the Criminal Code
is in a place may, at any time, issue a warrant 
authorizing  a peace officer, at any time, to search the 
place for any such controlled substance, precursor, 
property or thing and to seize it.
... ... ...
(5) Where a peace officer who executes a warrant 
issued under subsection (1) has reasonable grounds to 
believe that any person found in the place set out in the 
warrant has on their person any controlled substance, 
precursor, property or thing  set out in the warrant, the 
peace officer may search the person for the controlled 
substance, precursor, property or thing and seize it.
(6) A peace officer who executes a warrant issued 
under subsection (1) may seize, in addition to the 
things mentioned in the warrant,
(a) any controlled substance or precursor in respect of 
which the peace officer believes on reasonable grounds 
that this Act has been contravened;
(b) any thing  that the peace officer believes on 
reasonable grounds to contain or conceal a controlled 
substance or precursor referred to in paragraph (a);
(c) any thing  that the peace officer believes on 
reasonable grounds is offence-related property; or
(d) any thing  that the peace officer believes on 
reasonable grounds will afford evidence in respect of 
an offence under this Act.
Where warrant not necessary
(7) A peace officer may exercise any of the powers 
described in subsection (1), (5) or (6) without a warrant 
if the conditions for obtaining  a warrant exist but by 
reason of exigent circumstances it would be 
impracticable to obtain one.
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where a justice is satisfied 
by information on oath that 
there are “reasonable 
grounds” to believe any 
such substance is in that 
place. As is well known, a 
“place” includes a motor 
vehicle and “reasonable 
g r o u n d s ” m e a n s 
“reasonable and probable 
grounds”.
From a purely textual 
standpoint, s. 11(7) is broad enough to cover 
searches incident to arrest. However, the modern 
approach to statutory interpretation enjoins 
courts to consider Parliament’s words in the light 
provided by the context within which they are 
used ...  That exercise leads me to conclude that 
s. 11(7) has no application to searches of motor 
vehicles conducted in the lawful exercise of the 
common law power of search incident to the 
driver’s arrest.  
I begin by underscoring the CDSA’s silence on 
the subject of the common law power of search 
incident to arrest. This state of affairs is 
particularly revelatory of Parliament’s intention 
when one bears in mind both 
the power ’s longs tanding 
acceptance by the courts, and 
the direction in s. 13(3) of the 
CDSA that once a controlled 
substance is seized “pursuant to 
a power of seizure at common 
l aw” , t he CDSA and i t s 
regulations apply in respect of 
that substance. Section 13(3) 
would be superfluous if the 
common law power of search 
incident to arrest was subsumed 
under s. 11(7).
 
 As well, and from a broader perspective, it bears 
remembering that s. 11(7) is part of a search and 
seizure scheme which, as a matter of law and 
proven fact, requires reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe that a controlled substance 
will be found in the place to be searched. A 
search incident to arrest does not fit within that 
scheme because it may be lawfully performed in 
t h e a b s e n c e o f s u ch 
grounds. ...  [references 
omitted, paras. 45-48]
In this case, the common law 
power of search incident to 
arrest did not offend s.8  of 
the Charter if (1) the G6 
driver’s arrest was lawful; (2) 
t h e s e a r c h w a s t r u l y 
incidental to his arrest; and 
(3) the search was effectuated 
in a reasonable manner. In 
searching  the trunk and duffle bag  the police were 
acting  for a purpose directly related to the driver’s 
arrest.  As for the scope of the power as it relates to 
vehicles Justice Drapeau held:
[M]y view is that, where the evidence 
establishes a reasonable basis to search the trunk 
for evidence referable to the offence of arrest, 
there is no compelling reason to exclude that 
vehicular compartment, whether open or closed, 
from the spatial scope of the power of search 
incident to arrest ... To hold otherwise would be 
illogical once it is accepted that: (1) the power in 
question extends to the arrestee's “immediate 
surroundings” ... which covers his or her motor 
vehicle ...; and (2) the search's 
legitimate objectives include the 
d i scovery and se izure o f 
incriminating evidence referable 
to the offence of arrest ... Thus, I 
reject the American approach, 
which, in its most recent 
formulation, restricts to the 
passenger compartment the 
power of vehicle searches 
incident to an occupant's 
arrest ... [references omitted, 
para. 51]
Reasonable Grounds For Arrest
And finally, the Court ruled that the police had 
reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest. In 
order for the driver’s arrest to be lawful the officer:
... had to subjectively believe on the basis of 
objectively sufficient grounds that [the driver] 
had committed an indictable offence for which 
“The objective component of 
the test is satisfied if ... a 
reasonable person, standing in 
the arresting officer’s shoes, 
would have believed there were 
reasonable and probable 
grounds to make the arrest.”
“[W]here the evidence establishes a 
reasonable basis to search the trunk 
for evidence referable to the offence 
of arrest, there is no compelling reason 
to exclude that vehicular compartment, 
whether open or closed, from the 
spatial scope of the power of search 
incident to arrest.”
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he could be arrested without a warrant. The 
objective component of the test is satisfied if, as 
the trial judge recognized, a reasonable person, 
standing in the arresting officer’s shoes, would 
have believed there were reasonable and 
probable grounds to make the arrest.   
It is absolutely clear that ... the arresting 
officer ... was entitled to rely on the information 
provided by [other officers] in forming his own 
belief, on reasonable and probable grounds, that 
[the driver] had committed an arrestable 
indictable offence. The applicable standard is 
not proof beyond reasonable doubt. All the law 
requires is this: the officers must believe the 
arrestee has committed an indictable offence for 
which he or she can be arrested without warrant 
and this belief must be founded upon 
information giving rise, on an objective basis, to 
a “credibly based probability” that such an 
offence was indeed committed ...   [references 
omitted, paras. 52-53]
In this case, the trial judge found the arresting  officer 
subjectively believed in the existence of reasonable 
grounds and those grounds were objectively 
discernible. The facts, taken together, met the legal 
standard of reasonable and probable grounds.  Even 
though “none of the tidbits of supporting 
information ... carried stand-alone probative value 
[,] courts must look to the totality of the pertinent 
circumstances to determine whether the arresting 
officer had the requisite reasonable and probable 
grounds to effect the warrantless arrest at issue.” 
“In my view, the cumulative effect of the individual 
pieces of supporting  data, viewed contextually, 
commonsensically, and in light of [the arresting 
officer’s] significant training  and experience in 
investigations under the CDSA, is sufficiently 
compelling  for this Court to agree with the trial 
judge’s conclusion that the G6 driver’s arrest was 
carried out with the requisite reasonable and 
probable grounds,” said Chief Justice Drapeau. “In 
my respectful judgment, it follows from the 
foregoing  that there was also a reasonable basis for 
[the arresting  officer’s] search of the G6’s trunk and 
the duffle bag.”
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
BELIEF SKITTLES CONTAINER 
MAY CONTAIN WEAPON 
REASONABLE
 R. v. Abdo, 2009 ABCA 340
At about 2:45 am, two police 
officers stopped a car driven by the 
accused because it was swerving 
and speeding  and they believed the 
diver might be impaired. When they 
looked in the car, they saw a sword resting  on the 
floor, with the handle tucked between the console 
and the front passenger seat, within arm’s reach of 
the accused. He was was ordered out of the car and 
arrested for possession of a weapon. He was asked 
to place his hands on the car for a pat down search 
because of a concern for officer safety. The accused 
did not comply and appeared to be attempting  to 
hide something. The searching  officer thought the 
accused might have a weapon. He felt a hard object 
in the accused’s genital area and removed a Skittles 
container from his pants. The searching  officer 
thought the Skittles container might enclose a 
weapon so he opened it and discovered 17 pieces of 
cocaine. The accused was arrested for possession of 
a controlled substance.
At trial in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench the 
accused argued his Charter rights under ss. 8  and 9 
had been breached. The trial judge held that the 
initial detention was lawful because the officers had 
reasonable cause to suspect that the accused was 
impaired. She found that reasonable grounds for 
arrest for the weapons offence were established on 
both a subjective and objective basis because the 
accused was driving  at 2:45 am with swords within 
arm’s reach. There was a valid purpose for the pat 
down search incidental to arrest because the 
accused had been arrested for a weapons offence 
and there was a reasonable concern for officer 
safety. She found that the officers had a subjective 
belief that the hard object might be a weapon and, 
once retrieved, that the Skittles container might hold 
drugs, drug  paraphernalia or a weapon and there 
was an objective basis for those beliefs. Therefore, 
there were no Charter breaches and the accused was 
convicted of possessing  cocaine for the purpose of 
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trafficking  and possessing  a 
weapon for a dangerous purpose. 
The accused then appealed his 
convictions to the Alberta Court 
of Appeal. Justice Costigan, 
delivering  the judgment for the 
Appeal Court, first noted that the 
standards of review for issues 
relating  to reasonable and 
probable grounds are well 
settled:
• A trial judge’s factual 
findings are entitled to deference; and 
• the application of a legal standard to the facts 
is a question of law reviewable on the 
correctness standard. 
In this case, the Appeal Court was not satisfied that 
the trial judge did not err:
The trial judge correctly articulated the relevant 
legal tests and the facts she found were 
sufficient, at law, to support her conclusion that 
those tests were met. The evidence supports the 
trial judge’s conclusion that the officers had 
r ea sonab l e and p robab l e 
grounds to arrest the [accused] 
for possession of a weapon for a 
dangerous purpose after they 
detained him in the early 
morning hours and observed the 
location of the swords. The fact 
that there might be innocent 
reasons why the [accused] had 
the swords in the car could have 
a n i m p a c t o n wh e t h e r a 
reasonable doubt exists but it 
does not detract from the 
r ea sonab l e and p robab l e 
grounds of the police officers at 
the scene.
The evidence also supports the trial judge’s 
conclusion that the search of the [accused’s] 
person was reasonable given the arrest for a 
weapons offence and the concern for officer 
safety. Moreover, the evidence supports her 
conclusion that it was reasonable to extend the 
search to the contents of the Skittles container 
given the officers’ belief that it might enclose a 
weapon. [paras. 7-8]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
“The fact that there might be 
innocent reasons why the 
[accused] had the swords in 
the car could have an impact 
on whether a reasonable 
doubt exists but it does not 
detract from the reasonable 
and probable grounds of the 
police officers at the scene.”
See page 20
